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Worst-Case Robust Distributed Power
Allocation in Shared Unlicensed Spectrum
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Abstract
This paper considers non-cooperative and fully-distributed power-allocation for selfish transmitter-
receiver pairs in shared unlicensed spectrum when normalized-interference to each receiver is uncertain.
We model each uncertain parameter by the sum of its nominal (estimated) value and a bounded additive
error in a convex set, and show that the allocated power always converges to its equilibrium, called robust
Nash equilibrium (RNE). In the case of a bounded and symmetric uncertainty region, we show that the
power allocation problem for each user is simplified, and can be solved in a distributed manner. We
derive the conditions for RNE’s uniqueness and for convergence of the distributed algorithm; and show
that the total throughput (social utility) is less than that at NE when RNE is unique. We also show that for
multiple RNEs, the social utility may be higher at a RNE as compared to that at the corresponding NE,
and demonstrate that this is caused by users’ orthogonal utilization of bandwidth at RNE. Simulations
confirm our analysis.
Index Terms
Distributed power control, robust game theory, spectrum sharing, uncertainty region, worst-case
optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opportunistic spectrum sharing where multiple wireless transmitters and receivers share the same
portion of bandwidth is a promising approach for improving spectrum efficiency in future wireless
communication systems [1]. In this setup, each user aims to maximize its utility subject to its power limit
and other regulatory restrictions, such as spectrum mask and/or the maximum amount of interference [2].
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2Because of the inherently decentralized and competitive nature of allocating power to users, game
theory [3] is an appropriate tool for analyzing such systems [4]–[8]. In this context, the power allocation
problem is formulated as a strategic non-cooperative game, where each user is considered as a rational
player that competes with others by choosing a transmission strategy for maximizing its own utility,
defined as its throughput. In a game, Nash equilibrium (NE) is a state, consisting of the strategy space
and utility values, at which there is no incentive for any player to change its strategy, provided that
other players’ strategies are not changed. As such, one needs to derive the conditions for existence and
uniqueness of NE, to develop a distributed algorithm for reaching NE, and to examine the convergence
conditions for that algorithm.
The well known iterative water-filling algorithm (IWFA) for reaching NE of a power allocation game,
as well as the conditions for existence of NE and convergence conditions of IWFA are proposed in [9].
Besides, in [1], [4], [6], [10]–[15], other distributed water-filling based algorithms and conditions for their
convergence are studied, and the sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of NE under different
power constraints and system models are derived. In many of the existing power allocation schemes (e.g.,
in [11]–[18]), it is assumed that the channel state information, and interference from other users plus
noise (IN) are available to each user. However, this assumption may not be valid in practice, due to the
time-varying environment and inaccurate measurements, resulting in uncertainties in parameter values.
Motivated by the aforementioned challenge, we wish to develop a robust game-theoretic approach
for tackling such uncertainties in the power allocation problem. Generally, to model the uncertainty,
each uncertain parameter is assumed to be the sum of its nominal (or estimated value) and an additive
error [19]. Based on the available information on the additive error, a robust approach is considered.
In the literature, there are two major approaches for introducing robustness [19], [20]: The Bayesian
approach where the statistics of errors are considered and the network’s performance is probabilistically
guaranteed; and the worst-case approach where a deterministic value bounded with a given probability
in a closed region (called the uncertainty region), is considered for the additive error, and the network’s
performance is guaranteed for any realization of uncertainty within the uncertainty region. In this paper,
for brevity, we use the term “bounded” instead of the term “bounded with a given probability”. Both
of the above mentioned approaches have been applied to the power allocation problem in spectrum
sharing environments. The term “worst-case approach” is used in the literature to denote the fact that for
any realization of uncertainty in the bounded region, including the bounds (i.e., the worst-case for the
uncertainty), the network’s performance is guaranteed by the proposed robust approach.
In [7], a probabilistic robust IWFA is proposed, where IN levels are uncertain; and by assuming a
3uniform probability density function (pdf) for uncertainty in IN levels, the power allocation problem is
converted to the conventional IWFA, but the IN level is multiplied by a factor that corresponds to the
stochastic nature of uncertainty. In [8], the worst-case robust optimization theory is used when uncertainty
in the channel state information between users is bounded in an ellipsoid region to derive the conditions
for NE’s existence and uniqueness, and a distributed algorithm that needs additional message passing
between users is proposed. Compared to pervious works, our main contributions in this paper are two
folds. First, we propose a simple robust distributed power allocation scheme that does not need any
additional message passing in the system; and second, we analyze and compare the equilibrium of the
robust approach with that of the power allocation problem with no uncertainties.
In doing so, we assume that the IN level for each user normalized by its direct channel gain is uncertain,
and as in [5], [8], model each uncertain parameter by the sum of its nominal (estimated) value plus a
bounded additive error, the collection of which for all instances of error form the uncertainty region.
The corresponding game is based on the robust optimization theory [21], where each user obtains its
transmit power level that maximizes its throughput in the worst-case instance in the uncertainty region
[20], and the equilibrium of such a game is called the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE). We will show that
when the uncertainty region is a closed convex set, RNE always exists, but a closed form solution for
RNE may not be obtainable for some forms of the uncertainty region. We focus on bounded symmetric
uncertainties, and utilize the framework in [13], [14] to obtain the necessary conditions for uniqueness of
RNE. Moreover, to reach RNE, we will apply the totally asynchronous and distributed power allocation
algorithm introduced in [22], and obtain the condition for its convergence.
Another important subject in this paper is to obtain the difference between RNE of the robust game with
uncertain parameter values and NE of the nominal game (the game with complete information). We show
how uncertainty affects the total throughout, i.e., the social utility of users at RNE as compared to that of
nominal game. We also show that when RNE is unique, the strategy of users as well as the social utility
of the game are decreasing functions of the bound on the uncertainty region. Besides, we demonstrate that
uncertainty reduces the total throughput of users when RNE is unique, but not necessarily for multiple
RNEs. When multiuser interference is high, multiple RNEs may exist in IWFA-based algorithms for
the robust game. In such cases, uncertainty may lead to a more orthogonal power allocation at one
RNE, resulting in less interference between users and consequently, higher total throughput of users as
compared to the total throughput of the nominal game.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model of a spectrum sharing
environment, and formulate a robust game for the power allocation problem, when users’ channel state
4information and IN levels are uncertain. In Section III, we investigate the existence and uniqueness
conditions of RNE in the proposed game, and study the effect of uncertainties on the total throughput
at RNE as compared to the same at NE of the complete information game. Our distributed algorithm is
proposed in Section IV, followed by simulation results in Section V, and conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a set of M = {1, · · · ,M} transmitter and receiver pairs sharing K = {1, · · · ,K}
orthogonal narrow band sub-channels. The bandwidth of each sub-channel is much less than the coherence
bandwidth of the wireless channel, meaning that the channel response of each sub-channel is flat. The
transmit power vector of the ith user over all sub-channels is p
i
= [p1i , · · · , p
K
i ], where pki is the transmit
power of the ith user in the kth sub-channel. The received signal power at the corresponding receiver in
sub-channel k is
rki =
M∑
j=1
pkjh
k
ji + σ
k
i , ∀j ∈M, k ∈ K, (1)
where hkji is the fading sub-channel gain from the jth transmitter to the ith receiver on the kth sub-channel,
and σki is the noise power in the kth sub-channel of the ith user. At receiver i, signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio (SINR) in sub-channel k is γki = p
k
i
ski
, where ski =
∑
j 6=i p
k
jh
k
ji+σ
k
i
hkii
denotes the induced
interference plus noise to user i normalized by its direct channel gain. We assume that at the receiver
of each user, the value of IN in each sub-channel and the corresponding direct channel gain hkii are
measured. The receiver calculates the value of ski which is the normalized interference caused due to
the direct channel gain, and sends it to the corresponding transmitter via the feedback channel. Each
transmitter uses the received value of ski to calculate the power level in each sub-channel. At the receiver,
the value of SINR in each sub-channel can be calculated by p
k
i
ski
, and the achievable rate for the ith
receiver is obtained by Ri =
∑K
k=1 log(1 + γ
k
i ). The transmit power of each user is subject to the
following constraints:
C1: The total transmit power of the ith user over all sub-channels is limited by its maximum power
budget, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 p
k
i ≤ p
max
i .
C2: The transmit power of each user on each sub-channel is limited, i.e., 0 ≤ pki ≤ pkmask, where
pkmask is the spectral mask on sub-channel k.
We assume that users cannot perform interference cancelation [13].
5A. Game Formulation
In noncooperative spectrum sharing in unlicensed bands, each user aims to maximize its own utility,
defined as its throughput, subject to C1 and C2. In contrast to cognitive radio networks where primary
(licensed) users have absolute priority over secondary (unlicensed) users in utilizing the frequency
spectrum, in noncooperative spectrum sharing in unlicensed bands [1], all users are treated the same, i.e.,
there is no priority among users. In such cases, noncooperative strategic game theory [3] is an appropriate
tool for analyzing such a greedy behavior by each users where all users act independently to achieve their
objectives without any coordination. The strategic game consists of three elements: the set of players,
the utility of each player, and the action set of players, where the action of each player is its strategy for
optimizing its utility.
For our power allocation problem, the set of players is the set of all transmitters and receivers in the
wireless channel denoted by M, the action of each player is its transmit power over K sub-channels
denoted by pi, and the utility of each user is its achieved throughput over all K sub-channels. This game
is denoted by G , 〈M, {Pi}i∈M, {ui}i∈M〉, where Pi is the action set of player i defined as
Pi , {pi |
K∑
k=1
pki ≤ p
max
i , 0 ≤ p
k
i ≤ p
k
mask, ∀k ∈ K}, (2)
and ui(p) is the utility of user i, and depends on the chosen strategy vector of all users, i.e.,
ui(p) =
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
ski
), (3)
where p = [p
i
,p
−i
], and p
−i
= [p
1
, · · · ,p
i−1
,p
i+1
, · · · ,p
M
] is a vector of the actions of all users except
user i.
In the noncooperative strategic game, each player maximizes its own utility based on actions of other
players. Since the utility function of each user for the power allocation problem is achieved throughput
i.e. (3), and its strategy space is defined by (2), optimization of the allocated power is stated by the
following problem
max
p
i
,p
−i
∑K
k=1 log(1 +
pki
ski
) (4)
subject to

 C1 :
∑K
k=1 p
k
i ≤ p
max
i
C2 : 0 ≤ p
k
i ≤ p
k
mask
The commonly used concept for analyzing the outcome of this type of game-theoretic schemes is the
Nash equilibrium (NE). NE represents a strategy set of all players in the game where no player can
6improve its utility by unilaterally changing its action [3]. In the power allocation problem, the strategy
profile p∗ = {p∗
1
, · · · ,p∗
M
} is NE for the game G if
ui(p
∗
i
,p∗
−i
) ≥ ui(pi ,p
∗
−i
), ∀p
i
∈ Pi, ∀i ∈ M. (5)
One approach for reaching NE is to use the best response dynamic algorithm [3], [13], [23]. For the
power allocation problem, the best response of user i, given the transmit power levels of other users,
is the optimal solution to (4) [13]. Since (4) is a convex optimization problem with respect to pi, its
solution can be obtained by the Lagrange dual function. The dual function of (4) is
Li(pi, λi) =
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
ski
) + λi × (
K∑
k=1
pki − p
max
i ), (6)
where λi > 0 is the dual variable for user i that satisfies its C1, i.e.,
λi × (
K∑
k=1
pki − p
max
i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ M. (7)
The allocated power to each user can be obtained by the first order optimality condition of the Lagrange
dual function, i.e., via ∂Li(pi,λi)
∂pi
= 0 as
pki = [
1
λi
− ski ]
pkmask
0 , (8)
where [x]ba for a < b denotes the Euclidean projection of x onto the interval [a, b], i.e., [x]ba = a if x < a,
[x]ba = ax if a < x < b, and [x]ba = b if b < x. This best response solution to (4) for each player is
called the water-filling solution [13], [24], and the iterative algorithm utilized by each player to reach
the equilibrium point is called the iterative water filling algorithm (IWFA) [9], [13], [14].
To analyze the performance of the game, one needs to investigate the existence and uniqueness of
NE, propose a distributed algorithm to reach NE, and obtain its convergence conditions. For the power
allocation problem, since the utility function ui(p) is concave on pi , and the action set of each user
is closed and convex, the game G has a nonempty solution set for any set of channels, spectral mask
constraints, and transmit power levels. Hence, a NE always exists [3]. However, uniqueness of NE for
the power control game cannot be guaranteed in the general case. To analyze the uniqueness of NE in
the power allocation problem, different conditions have been derived for the game G in the literature,
depending on the interference channel gains and noise levels in the system as in [9], [11], [13], [23],
[25] via best-response algorithms and principles of contraction mapping. Briefly, in all existing literature
(e.g., in [9], [13], [17]), it is shown that if multiuser interference is low, the game has a unique NE,
and when multiuser interference is high, the game has multiple NEs. In this paper, to analyze our robust
game, we utilize the framework introduced in [13] to derive the condition for uniqueness of RNE.
7B. Robust Counterpart Game Formulation
In the above formulation for game G, it is assumed that the exact value of ski for each sub-channel
is available to the respective receiver with no error. This value is sent to the corresponding user via the
feedback channel. However, due to the dynamic nature of spectrum sharing environments manifested
in channel variations, users’ movements, entering new users in the system, as well as the delay in the
feedback channel, errors are introduced in ski , which invalidate the assumption that the error-free value of
ski is available to the the respective user. This means that power allocation based on (8) cannot guarantee
the expected optimal utility of each user in reality.
To tackle this problem, in our formulation, we assume that each uncertain parameter ski is modeled by
the sum of its estimate (nominal value) and an uncertain term, i.e., s˜ki = s¯ki + sˆki , where s˜ki , s¯ki and sˆki are
the actual, nominal value and error in ski for the ith user, respectively. Similar to the robust optimization
in game theory [21], we assume that the statistics of uncertain parameters are unknown, but the distances
between the nominal and the actual values of uncertain parameters are bounded with a given probability,
i.e.,
Rs = {s˜i ∈ Rs|‖s˜i − s¯i‖ ≤ εi}, ∀i ∈ M, ∀k ∈ K. (9)
where ‖ · ‖ is any definition of norm for the vector space [24], s˜i = [s˜1i , · · · , s˜Ki ], sˆi = [sˆ1i , · · · , sˆKi ],
s¯i = [s¯
1
i , · · · , s¯
K
i ], and εi is the bound on the distance between the nominal and the actual value, and
εi is the size of the uncertainty region. Large values of εi expands the uncertainty region, meaning
higher uncertainties. Note that this approach can also be applied when the uncertain parameters behave
stochastically, and the bound on uncertainty can be obtained from the pdf of the error (see Appendix A).
The uncertain parameter is a new optimization variable in the optimization problem of each user, which
modifies the utility function of each user to
u˜i(p, s˜i) =
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
s˜ki
), (10)
and the robust counterpart of (4) is changed [20] to
max
pi,p−i
min
s˜i∈Rs
k∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
s˜ki
) (11)
subject to

 C1 :
∑K
k=1 p
k
i ≤ p
max
i
C2 : 0 ≤ p
k
i ≤ p
k
mask
We define the corresponding robust game for the objective function (11) by G˜ , 〈M, {Pi}i∈M, {u˜i}i∈M〉.
For both games G and G˜, the sets M and Pi are the set of all users and the set of strategy profiles of
8each user in (2), respectively. The difference between these two games comes from the uncertainty in
the utility function of G˜, and when εi = 0 for all players, these two games are the same. In this case,
the strategy profile p˜∗ = {p˜∗
1
, · · · , p˜∗
M
} is RNE of the game G˜ if
u˜i(p˜
∗
i
, p˜∗
−i
, s˜i) ≥ u˜i(pi , p˜
∗
−i
, s˜i), ∀pi ∈ Pi, ∀s˜i ∈ Rs, ∀i ∈ M. (12)
meaning that no user can achieve a higher utility by unilaterally changeling its strategy under any condition
of uncertainty at RNE.
III. ANALYSIS OF RNE
We now present our analysis on RNE’s existence and uniqueness. By considering uncertainty in the
game, equilibrium analysis for G˜ becomes more complicated than that for G. This is because the strategy
of each user depends on strategies of other users as well as on users’ uncertainty regions. In addition,
by considering uncertainty in the system, a new coupling is introduced in the game, which requires new
signalling between users [8]. Hence, design and implementation of such a network is more complicated
when RNE is considered. Comparing the total achieved utility of the system (i.e., the social utility) at
RNE with that at NE provides a measure of performance when robustness is introduced. Considering
these issues, we wish to
• Simplify the robust game to the extent possible, with a view to simplifying the implementation of
the system, and
• Determine the relationship between the social utility at RNE and at NE in both cases of unique
NE and multiple NEs, and obtain the relation between users’ strategies at RNE and the bound on
uncertainty.
A. Existence and Uniqueness of RNE
For any realization of error in the uncertainty region, the utility function for G˜ in the worst-case robust
approach, denoted by ψi(pi ,p−i) is
ψi(pi ,p−i) , min
s˜i∈Rs
k∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
s˜ki
), ∀i ∈ M. (13)
Since the norm function is convex [24], and Rs in (9) is assumed to be bounded and convex, ψi(pi ,p−i)
is continuous, and is concave on p
i
, when p
−i
is fixed. Therefore, for any channel realization, any bound
on the transmit power, and any constraint on spectral mask, there is an equilibrium, called RNE, for the
game G˜ (Theorem 2 in [21]).
9Although one can establish the existence of RNE from the characteristics of Rs, obtaining RNE
requires excessive calculations and depends on the representation of the uncertainty region, meaning
that the optimal transmit power cannot be obtained in a closed form. Hence, the conditions for RNE’s
uniqueness cannot be obtained in general by the fixed point approach and contraction mapping as in [13],
[14].
In practice, uncertainties in sub-channels can be considered as independent and identically distributed
(iid) random variables with Gaussian distribution, e.g., noise in wireless channels [26]–[28], the uncer-
tainty region can be modeled [21] as
sˆki = [−ε
k
i s¯
k
i , ε
k
i s¯
k
i ], (14)
where εki > 0. Compared to (9), the uncertainty region defined by (14) is decomposed into independent
intervals for each sub-channel. Hence, a bound on uncertainty, denoted by εki is considered for each
sub-channel and each user, which indicates the absolute distance between the nominal and the actual
interference levels in each sub-channel. For this type of uncertainties, we can simplify the game G˜, and
derive the conditions for uniqueness of its RNE.
Proposition 1. When (14) holds, RNE of the robust game G˜ is the same as NE of the game G with
the same number of users and strategy profile, and the optimal strategy is the solution to the following
problem
max
p
i
,p
−i
k∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
s¯ki (1 + ε
k
i )
) (15)
subject to

 C1 :
∑K
k=1 p
k
i ≤ p
max
i
C2 : p
k
i ≤ p
k
mask.
Proof: See Appendix B.
By using Proposition 1, the uncertain value of ski in the utility function of each user is replaced
by the scalar variable (1 + εki ) multiplied by the estimate of s¯ki . In this way, the uncertainty region is
represented in a deterministic manner in the robust optimization formula. Comparing the game G˜ whose
utility is stated in (11) with the robust game G˜ whose utility is stated in (15) shows that there is no new
optimization variable in (15). As such, analysis of the robust game G˜ is simplified and is similar to that
of the conventional IWFA. The solution to (15) can be obtained similar to that of (4) by utilizing the
Lagrange dual function as
pki = [
1
λi
− s¯ki (1 + ε
k
i )]
pkmask
0 , (16)
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where λi is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier that satisfies (7). Next, we derive the condition for
uniqueness of RNE in the robust game using the framework in [13].
Proposition 2. When (14) holds, RNE is unique if
min{
ρ(W(k) + WT (k))
2
, ‖W(k)‖2}+ ‖w(k)‖2 < 1, ∀k ∈ K, (17)
where ρ is the spectral radius of the matrix, W(k) is a M ×M matrix whose elements are
W ij(k) ,

 0 if i = jhkji
hkii
if i 6= j,
(18)
the value of ‖W(k)‖2 is the l2-norm of W(k), and w(k) = [εk1 , · · · , εkM ]. When W(k) is symmetric,
(17) reduces to
ρ(W(k)) + ‖w(k)‖2 < 1, k ∈ K. (19)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The difference between the condition for uniqueness of RNE in the robust game obtained by (19) and
that of the nominal game comes from ‖w(k)‖2, which indicates that the condition for RNE’s uniqueness
is tighter than that of the nominal game. This means that for some values of direct and interference
channel gains in the robust game, (19) is not satisfied, but the same values satisfy the condition for
uniqueness of NE in the nominal game, i.e., when εki = 0. Hence, enlarging the uncertainty region of
the system parameters reduces the probability of having a unique RNE in the robust game as compared
to the nominal game.
B. Comparison of Social Utility at RNE and at NE
Now we discuss the effect of uncertainty on RNE of G˜ as compared to NE of G in terms of the total
throughput of users and the number of sub-channels utilized by each user.
Theorem 1. When Proposition 2 holds,
1) The strategy of the robust game G˜, denoted by p˜∗, is a decreasing function of εki , i.e.,
∃ ε1ki < ε
2k
i ⇒ p˜
∗1 ≥ p˜∗2 (20)
where p˜∗1 and p˜∗2 are the strategy at RNE for ε1ki and ε2ki , respectively.
2) The social utility at RNE of G˜ is less than that of G, and is a decreasing function of εki , i.e.,
∃ ε1ki < ε
2k
i ⇒ u˜
∗1 ≥ u˜∗2 (21)
where u˜∗1 and u˜∗2 are the social utility for ε1ki and ε2ki , respectively.
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Proof: See Appendix D.
From Theorem 1, uncertainty will definitely reduce the total throughput of users when RNE is unique,
and the strategy at RNE is a decreasing function of εki for all users. However, this may not be true
when interference is high, i.e., when we encounter multiple NEs in G. By considering robustness in such
cases, from (16), we see that users with higher values of εki have to reduce their transmit power in those
sub-channels compared to users with smaller values of εki . As such, they cause less interference to other
users, which is advantageous from other users’ points of view. Consequently, we may see a higher total
throughput at a particular RNE as compared to the case for the corresponding NE, depending on the
interfering and direct channel gains between users [7], [8]. To explain the effect of uncertainty in the case
of multiple NEs, we define the orthogonal equilibrium in interference channels. At orthogonal equilibrium,
the transmit power levels of different users over each sub-channel are non-overlapping. Consider a subset
of sub-channels denoted by Ki ⊆ K utilized by user i. At orthogonal equilibrium, we have
Ki ∩ Kj = ∅ ∀i, j ∈ M, (22)
Proposition 3. Uncertainty in the game G˜ causes convergence to a RNE that has more orthogonality
than at NE of the game G.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Note that when interference is high, which corresponds to multiple NEs, the IWFA is suboptimal,
but orthogonal power allocation is optimal [1], [15]. By considering uncertainty, users are forced to
the orthogonal power allocation. Hence, the total throughput at RNE may be higher than that of the
corresponding NE, depending on the values of uncertain parameters, i.e., the interfering and direct channel
gains between users, noise levels, and power limitations [7], [8]. When multiple NEs occur in the game,
the social utility of users is a non-smooth and non-convex function, and hence, in general, one cannot
state that its value at RNE is higher or lower than its corresponding value at NE of the nominal game.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
A distributed power allocation algorithm without any message passing between users is very desirable
for spectrum sharing in unlicensed bands. For conventional IWFA, different iterative algorithms are
presented in [9], [14], [22] that include simultaneous, sequential and asynchronous updating procedures.
All existing algorithms pertaining to conventional IWFA can be applied in our robust approach without
any additional complexity, because uncertainty in our formulation is replaced by a scalar value multiplied
by the estimated value of the uncertain parameter. Among them, we focus on the asynchronous algorithm
12
because each user maximizes its own utility in a totally asynchronous manner, and there is no need for
any coordination or procedure between users for updating the allocated transmit power levels. As such,
it is the preferred approach in spectrum sharing environments. Before implementing the asynchronous
algorithm for the robust approach, we fist present an overview of the assumptions in the asynchronous
iterative waterfilling scheme [22].
We assume that users update their transmit power levels at discrete instances denoted by T =
{0, 1, 2, · · · }, and pi(t) denotes the transmit power level of user i at iteration t. During t * Ti, the
transmit power level of user i is unchanged. Let T be the total number of iterations for users’ updating
of their transmit power levels, and tsi be the last time that user i measured the interference from other
users at iteration t, where 0 < tsi < t. We denote the vector of measured interference levels over K sub-
channels at time tsi by si(tsi ) = [s1i (tsi ), · · · , sKi (tsi )]. At each iteration t when user i updates its transmit
power level, it uses si(tsi ) to solve its optimization problem. The asynchronous distributed algorithm is
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Asynchronous Worst-Case IWFA
Inputs for each user
Ti: The set of iteration times of user i
tsi : Last instance of measuring interference from other users for each iteration,
si(t
s
i ): Measured interference by user i at tsi ,
εki : Uncertainty region for all users in all sub-channels
Initialization For t = 0, set any feasible power allocation p
i
(0) for all i ∈ M,
Iterative algorithm For t = 1, 2, · · · , T :
Update the transmit power of each user by
pi(t+ 1) =


the solution of (16) based on si(tsi ) when t ∈ τi
pi(t) otherwise
,
End.
An important issue for any iterative algorithm is to determine the conditions for its convergence.
We derive the condition for the convergence of the asynchronous distributed algorithm to its RNE in
Proposition 4 using the sufficient condition for convergence of the conventional asynchronous IWFA [22].
Proposition 4. As T →∞, the asynchronous distributed algorithm for the robust IWFA converges to
the unique RNE from any initial power allocation pi(0) if ‖W
max
‖2+
√
|M |‖wmax‖2 < 1, where W
max
13
is a M ×M matrix whose elements are
W
max
ij ,

 0 if i = jmaxk∈K hkjihkii if i 6= j,
(23)
and wmax is a M × 1 vector whose ith element is maxk∈K s¯ki εki
Proof: See Appendix F.
From Proposition 4, the condition for convergence of the asynchronous algorithm at RNE depends
on the uncertainty region as well as on the number of users in the system. A larger uncertainty region
and/or a higher number of users reduces the probability of convergence of the asynchronous algorithm to
its optimal point. Again, we see that this condition is tighter than that of the game without uncertainty,
meaning that the probability of divergence of the distributed algorithm at RNE is higher than that of the
distributed algorithm at NE.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Now we provide simulation results to get an insight into the performance of G˜ for different bounds on
uncertainty as compared to G. In the following simulation, for convenience we assume that the values of
εki are equal for all users and all sub-channels, and denote it by ε. In all simulations, we compare the
total utility of users at RNE, which is the Shannon rates for users.
A. Unique NE
Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) show the effect of uncertainty on the total throughput of users when Proposition 2
holds, i.e., when RNE is unique, and multiuser interference is low. In this set up, the number of users is 8,
the number of sub-channels is 64, and pkmask = pmax. The values of hkii, hkji, and σki are randomly chosen
from the intervals [0, 0.1], [0, 0.01], and [0, 0.01], respectively, guaranteing that Proposition 2 holds, and
are multiplied by fading coefficients. The estimated error is assumed to be symmetrically distributed in
[−ε, ε] for all 64 sub-channels and for all users, and is added to the nominal value of ski .
In Fig. 1(a), the value of ski is uncertain, but in Fig. 1(b), while the exact value of ski is available, it is
assumed to be uncertain, i.e., ski is replaced by (1+ ε)ski . We take the average of total throughput values
of all users for 20 realizations of channel gains, each with a different error value ε. Note that expanding
the bound on uncertainty, reduces the total throughput of users as compared to the case that there is
no uncertainty, as expected form Theorem 1, since the social utility of the robust game is a decreasing
function of ε. The impact of uncertainty in Fig. 1(b) is much less than that in Fig. 1(a), meaning that in
such cases, the utility of each user is not significantly affected by higher interference.
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Fig. 1. Total throughput of users for different values of ε when Proposition 2 holds (i.e., when multiuser interference is low).
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Fig. 2. Total throughput of users for different values of ε when Proposition 2 does not hold (i.e., when multiuser interference
is high).
B. Multiple NEs
To show the impact of uncertainty in cases that we encounter multiple NEs, we assume that Proposition
2 does not hold, meaning that multiuser interference is very high. The values of hkii, hkji, and σki are
randomly chosen from the intervals [0, 0.1], [0, 1], and [0, 0.01] respectively. Again, we consider 8 users
and 64 sub-channels, and take the average of total throughput values of all users for 20 realizations of
channel gains, each with a different error value ε. The results are shown in Figs. 2 (a) and (b). In Fig.
15
2 (a), users encounter uncertainty, and in Fig. 2 (b), although the exact value of ski is available, it is
assumed to be uncertain, i.e., ski is replaced by (1 + ε)ski .
As expected from Proposition 3, for some values of uncertainty, the robust game has a better perfor-
mance than that of the conventional IWFA in both of the above cases, because uncertainty causes the
game to converge to the orthogonal NE, resulting in a higher total throughput in some cases. The same
is numerically shown in [5], where the average throughput in the robust power allocation problem is
shown to be very close to that of the conventional IWFA, and in [7], where a higher throughput for the
probabilistic robust algorithm is reported as compared to that of the case where complete information is
utilized by IWFA. Also, as we see in Fig. 2 (b), in high interference scenarios, a higher estimate for the
interference is advantageous as it may lead to orthogonal power allocations and consequently, a higher
utility for each user, as expected from Proposition 3.
TABLE II
CHANNEL GAINS OF 3 USERS
k 1 2 3 4 5 6
h11 20.52 2.0 2.08 10.56 0.44 1.6
h12 4.91 4.97 3.95 3.94 2.95 5.95
h13 7.9 5.97 2.97 4.92 1.93 6.94
h21 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.99
h22 2.44 26.32 23.2 3.64 3.92 0.68
h23 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.934 0.95
h31 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.96
h32 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.98 0.97
h33 3.6 24 6 1.6 34 40
σ21 2.2 0.26 4.1 3.06 0.02 0.02
σ22 8.24 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.06
σ23 0.22 0.26 4.08 1.06 0.02 0.02
To observe how the robust power allocation algorithms converge to the orthogonal equilibrium, let
us consider 3 users in the system, K = 6, pmax = 1, pkmask = 0.5 Watts, and channel gains and noise
coefficients as in Table II. In Tables III and IV, we show the allocated power to each user in G and G˜,
respectively. As can be seen for G, users spread their allocated transmit power in different sub-channels,
and induce interference to other users. Note that user 1 uses k = 1, 2, 4, whereas at RNE of G˜, each
user concentrates its power on the best sub-channels, e.g., user 1 only uses sub-channels 1 and 4, whose
direct channel gains denoted by h111 and h411 are higher than those of other sub-channels, and whose
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interference channel gains denoted by h121, h421, h131, and h431 are lower than those of other sub-channels
as shown in Table II. The same is true for users 2 and 3. This means that in the game G˜, all users use
their best sub-channels and the allocated transmit power levels to users are orthogonal, i.e., there is no
interference between users; hence the total aggregate throughput of users is increased. As can be seen
in Tables III and IV, in this case, the throughput of each user is also increased as compared to those of
the game G. However, in general, the throughput of each user depends on its channel, and may not be
increased in all instances in the robust game.
TABLE III
POWER ALLOCATION BY 3 USERS AT NE OF G
useri ui p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
user1 1.92 0.44 0.1 0 0.45 0 0
user2 3.82 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
user3 10.9 0 0.0059 0.3049 0 0.32 0.37
TABLE IV
POWER ALLOCATION BY 3 USERS AT RNE OF G˜ FOR ε = 3
useri ui p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
user1 1.93 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0
user2 3.95 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
user3 11.17 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5
C. Comparison of Performances of Worst-Case and Probabilistic Approaches
Finally, we compare the performance of our proposed RNE with that of the probabilistic approach
in [7] that guarantees that the achieved throughput of users is higher than a specific value with a given
probability δ0 under any level of uncertainty in the value of IN in each sub-channel. The value of δ0 = 0
means that there is no guarantee to achieve the specific data rate under any level of uncertainty in IN, and
higher values of δ0 provides more protection for the required data rate against uncertainty in IN levels.
In [7], the objective function of the robust game is changed to the probability of achieving different data
rates, which is generally hard to solve. To simplify the problem and obtain a closed form solution, they
assumed that uncertainty in each parameter is confined to (14) and its probability density function (pdf)
is uniform. Under such assumptions, the robust probabilistic counterpart of G is simplified in such a way
that the uncertainty multiplier for s¯ki in (15) in our worst-case algorithm, i.e., (1 + ε) is replaced by
17
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Fig. 3. Total throughput of users for different values of δ0 in the probabilistic approach as compared to that of the worst-case
approach when Proposition 2 holds (i.e., when multiuser interference is low).
(1− ε+ 2× ε× δ0). Hence, one can consider the probabilistic approach as a special case of worst-case
approach with uncertainty bound (1− ε+ 2× ε× δ0). When 0 ≤ δ0 < 0.5, the effect of uncertainty on
NE of the probabilistic approach is less than that of the worst-case approach; and when 0.5 ≤ δ0 ≤ 1,
the probabilistic approach is more robust than the worst-case approach. This phenomenon is shown in
Figs. 3 and 4 for the case with a unique RNE and for multiple RNEs, respectively.
As another example, we now consider ε = 0.8 to compare the performances of the worst-case and
probabilistic approaches for different values of δ0. When RNE is unique and 0 < δ0 < 0.5, i.e., (1− ε+
2× ε× δ0) < (1+ ε), the social utility of the probabilistic approach is higher than that of the worst-case
approach, which is in line with Theorem 1, since the social utility is a decreasing function of the size of
the uncertainty region. In contrast, for 0.5 ≤ δ0 ≤ 1, i.e., when (1− ε+2× ε× δ0) ≥ (1+ ε), the social
utility of the worst-case approach is higher than that of the probabilistic approach at the RNE. This may
not be true for the case of multiple RNEs. As stated in Proposition 3, uncertainty may result in more
orthogonality at a RNE as compared to the non-robust approach and/or to the case with less uncertainty.
In such cases, the total throughput may be higher at a RNE, as shown in Fig. 4.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the impact of uncertainty in the channel state information and in interference levels on the
total throughput of users in shared unlicensed spectrum via robust game theory. To devise a robust power
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approach when Proposition 2 does not hold (i.e., when multiuser interference is high).
allocation in such environments, we focused on bounded and symmetrically distributed uncertainties, and
showed that this game can be considered as a conventional IWFA with system parameters multiplied
by bounds on uncertainty. The conditions for existence and uniqueness of RNE and for convergence of
the proposed distributed algorithms of the robust game were derived via the conventional IWFA. The
performance of the robust game was compared to that of the conventional IWFA in terms of its total
throughput. In the case of multiple RNEs, we showed that the orthogonal use of sub-channels by users
at a RNE may lead to a higher total throughput of users as compared to that of the conventional IWFA.
APPENDIX A
MODELING UNCERTAINTY BY NORM FUNCTION
In this appendix, we explain the relationship between the size of the uncertainty region denoted by εi,
and the stochastic nature of the uncertain parameters by utilizing Section 8.5.5. in [19] and [29]. Let x
be the uncertain parameter for which we have xˆ = x˜ − x¯, where x˜, x¯, and xˆ are the exact value, the
nominal (or estimated) value, and the error in x, respectively. Assume that error has a specific probability
distribution function (pdf) f(xˆ), such as Gaussian or uniform. One can find the uncertainty region in
such a way that with probability P , any realization of uncertain parameter falls in the uncertainty region.
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The generic formulation of this statement is∫
‖x˜−x¯‖≤εi
f(x˜− x¯)dxˆ ≤ P (24)
For different types of uncertainty, each with a different pdf, a different uncertainty region can be obtained.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As in Theorem 4 in [21], consider a robust finite game, with M players, without private information, in
which ui(xi, ai) is a continuous and differentiable utility function for the ith player, xi is the strategy vector
of that player, ai is the vector of uncertain parameters where aji is its jth element, and its uncertainty
region is defined by the following interval
aji = [a
lower
ji , a
upper
ji ],
where alowerji and a
upper
ji are the corresponding lower and upper bounds of the uncertain parameter, respec-
tively. We denote the utility of the nominal game for user i by ui(xi, adi ), where adi is the deterministic
vector of system parameter and adji is its jth element. Note that adi is not the optimization vector in the
nominal game, and that the nominal game has only one optimization vector, namely xi.
For the robust game, the utility function for user i is denoted by u˜i(xi, ai), where ai is the vector of
uncertain parameter, and both ai and xi are the optimization vectors. The RNE of the robust game is
{x1, · · · , xM} iff it is also the NE of a finite game with complete information, and with the same number
of players and the same strategy space, with the following utility function (Theorem 4 in [21])
u˜i(xi, a
d
i ) = ui(xi, a˜
d
i ), (25)
where a˜di is the new vector related to the uncertain parameter and its jth element a˜dji is
a˜dji =

 a
upper
ji , if
∂u˜i(ai,xi)
∂aji
≥ 0
aupperji if
∂u˜i(ai,xi)
∂aji
< 0.
(26)
In the above reformulation, the robust utility function has only one optimization vector, i.e., xi, and the
uncertain parameter is replaced by the deterministic value that depends on the derivative of the robust
utility function with respect to its uncertain parameter. In our robust game G˜, the derivative of (10) with
respect to the uncertain parameter s˜ki is
∂u˜i
∂s˜ki
=
−pki
s˜ki (s˜
k
i + p
k
i )
. (27)
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Since pki ≥ 0 and interference is always a positive value, we have
∂u˜i
∂s˜ki
< 0 (28)
For our robust game, the upper bound of the uncertain parameter in each sub-channel denoted by aupperji
is equal to s¯ki + εis¯ki . Hence, the RNE can be obtained when
u˜i(p, s
d
i ) = ui(p, s˜
d
i ) (29)
where s˜di is a deterministic vector of the uncertainty si, and s˜dki is its kth elements where s˜dki = s¯ki +εis¯ki .
Hence, we have
u˜i(p, s˜i) = (ui(p, s˜
d
i ))s˜dki =s¯ki+εis¯ki =
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
pki
s¯ki (1 + ε
k
i )
). (30)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For the complete information game G, NE is unique [13] if
ρ(W(k)) < 1 ∀k ∈ K, (31)
where ρ is the spectral radius of W(k), and W(k) is a M ×M matrix whose elements are
Wij(k) =

 0 if i = jhkji
hkii
if i 6= j.
(32)
By considering uncertainty in si, the robust game G˜ has a unique RNE if
max
si∈Rs ∀i∈M
ρ(W(k)) < 1. (33)
If the uncertainty region is modeled by (14), we have W(k) = W(k) + Ŵ(k), where W(k) is a M ×M
matrix whose elements are
W ij(k) =

 0 if i = jhkji
hkii
if i 6= j,
(34)
and Ŵ(k) is a matrix of the uncertain parts of system parameters in which the sum of its ith row is less
than εki . Recall that Frobenius norm of a matrix is ‖W ij(k)‖F =
∑
i,jW
2
ij(k) and that ‖W ij(k)‖2 ≤
‖W ij(k)‖F . Thus
max
s˜i∈Rs ∀i∈M
ρ(W(k)) ≤ ‖W ij(k)‖2 + ‖Ŵij(k)‖2 ≤ ‖W ij(k)‖2 + ‖Ŵij(k)‖F ≤ ‖W ij(k)‖2 + ‖wk‖2. (35)
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where wk = [εk1 , · · · , εkM ]. On the other hand, from Theorem 1.1 in [30] we have
max
‖G‖F <1
ρ(F + G) ≤ ρ(F + F
T
2
) + 1.
Thus
max
‖Ŵ‖F <‖wk‖2
ρ(W + Ŵ) ≤ ρ(W + W
T
2
) + ‖wk‖2.
For a symmetric W, we have Ŵ = ŴT, ρ(W+W
T
2 ) = ρ(Ŵ) ≤ ‖Ŵij(k)‖2, and hence, (17) reduces to
(19).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove this Theorem, we use variational inequalities (VI) to reformulate NE, and derive the rela-
tionship between p∗ and p˜∗.
Step 1: Consider that the nominal NE is the solution to the following variational inequalities (Propo-
sition 1.4.2 in [31] and [16]),
p∗ = Solution to (V I(P,F)) (36)
where P =
∏
i∈M Pi, F = (Fi)
M
i=1, Fi = σi +
∑M
j=1Mijpj , σi = (σ
k
i /h
k
ii)
K
k=1, and Mij =
diag(h
k
ji
hkii
)Mj=1. Considering uncertainty in the parameters can be viewed as perturbation in F = (Fi)Mi=1,
which we show by F˜ = (F˜i)Mi=1, where F˜i has the same definition as Fi except that σ˜i = (σki (1 +
εki )/h
k
ii)
K
k=1 and Mij = diag(
hkji(1+ε
k
i )
hkii
)Mj=1. From the above, we consider the solution to G˜ as a solution
to V I(P,F + q), where q = max εki
hkij
hkii
. For the Affine VI, when Proposition 2 holds, since M is strictly
copositive, F is strongly monotone (31).
Step 2: When F is strongly monotone, the solution to V I(P,F + q), i.e., ϕ(−q) is a monotone plus
single-valued map (Corollary 2.9.17 in [31]).
Statement: When F is strongly monotone, ϕ(−q) is a decreasing function of −q.
Proof: Recall that when F is strongly monotone, ϕ(−q) is monotone (Corollary 2.9.17 in [31]). To
prove this statement, we first assume that ϕ(−q) is an increasing monotone function of −q, i.e.,
C1: − q1 < −q2 ⇒ ϕ(−q1) < ϕ(−q2),
From the definition of VI for any concave optimization problem (Chapter 1 in [31]), we have
(b− ϕ(−q))(F + q) < 0, ∀b ∈ P. (37)
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Since ϕ(−q1) and ϕ(−q2) belong to P, we have
(ϕ(−q1)− ϕ(−q2))(F + q2) < 0 (38)
(ϕ(−q2)− ϕ(−q1))(F + q1) < 0 (39)
We subtract (38) from (39) and write
(ϕ(−q1)− ϕ(−q2))(q2 − q1) < 0, (40)
From C1, we have (ϕ(−q1)−ϕ(−q2)) < 0. Hence, to hold (40), we should have q2− q1 > 0 or q2 > q1.
Clearly, q2 > q1 contradicts with C1. This contradiction shows that ϕ(−q) is a decreasing monotone
function of −q.
In our problem, ϕ(−q) is the solution to the robust game and we have q = max εki
hkji
hkii
for all sub-
channels and all users. This means that by increasing uncertainty, the power allocated to each user, i.e.,
ϕ(−q), is reduced as compared to that of the nominal game. In other words, when ε1ki > ε2ki for all
sub-channels, and p˜∗1 and p˜∗2 are the RNE of G˜ for ε1ki and ε2ki , we have
ε1ki > ε
2k
i ∀k,=⇒ p˜
∗
1 < p˜
∗
2. (41)
Also, for affine VI, the solution set is closed and continuous (Corollary 2.6.4 of [31]). Therefore, the
strategy at RNE, i.e., p˜∗ is a decreasing function of εki (Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 1 in [32]). Also, for
the nominal game, when ε2ki = 0, we have
εki > 0 ∀k,=⇒ p˜
∗ < p∗. (42)
Step 3: Since F is strongly monotone, the utility function is strictly concave. Hence, for (41), we have
p˜∗1 < p˜
∗
2 ⇒
∑
i∈M
u˜(p˜∗1) <
∑
i∈M
u˜(p˜∗2), (43)
where
∑
i∈M u˜(p˜
∗
1) and
∑
i∈M u˜(p˜
∗
2) are the social utilities at RNE of G˜ for ε1ki and ε2ki , respectively.
The social utility of the nominal game is obtained when εki = 0 for all users and for all sub-channels in
G. Since the social utility is a decreasing function of εki , we have
εki > 0 ∀k,=⇒ p
∗ > p˜∗ =⇒
∑
i∈M
u˜i(p˜
∗) <
∑
i∈M
ui(p˜
∗), (44)
where
∑
i∈M u˜i(p˜
∗) and
∑
i∈M ui(p˜
∗) are the social utilities of G and G˜, respectively. Therefore, the
social utility of the robust game is always less than that of the nominal game.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Assume that the ith user converges to p∗i at NE of G, for which there is a corresponding sk∗i , and the
set of all sub-channels with nonzero power allocation by the ith user is denoted by I∗i . Consequently, p˜∗i ,
s˜∗ki , and I˜∗i belongs to the game G˜. In what follows, we will show that I˜∗i ⊆ I∗i . In doing so, we denote
the Lagrange multipliers at NE of the games G and G˜ by λ∗i and λ˜∗i , respectively, which are increasing
functions of ski . For user i we have
1
λ˜∗i
≤
1
λ∗i
=
∑
k∈I∗i
sk∗i + p
max
i <
∑
i 6=j p
q∗
j h
q
ji + σ
q
hqii
, (45)
where q /∈ I˜i. Obviously, p∗i of the ith user leads to sk∗i ≤ ski ∀i, k. Therefore, for any power allocation
strategy pi ∈ p, we have ∑
i 6=j p
q∗
j h
q
ji + σ
q
hqii
< (1 + εqi )
∑
i 6=j p
q
jh
q
ji + σ
q
hqii
. (46)
From (45) and (46), those sub-channels that are not used in G are not used in G˜ as well. Now, as stated
in Theorem 1 in [13], when multi-user interference is high, an orthogonal NE always exists for the game
G. When the ith user chooses a q′ ∈ I˜i, it is orthogonal to those of other users. Assuming this, for any
other power allocation profile of other users, we have
(1 + εq
′
i )
σq
′
hq
′
ii
< (1 + εq
′
i )
∑
i 6=j p
q′
j h
q′
ji + σ
q′
hq
′
ii
, ∀i ∈ M. (47)
Since s˜∗ki ≫ 1, the utility at RNE for each user is higher than that of any other strategy profile. Hence,
there is no incentive for other users to change their strategy profile from the orthogonal RNE. As such,
RNE of G˜ is more orthogonal than NE of G.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
For the game with complete information G, it is proved in Theorems 3 in [22] that the asynchronous
distributed algorithm converges if
ρ(Wmax) < 1 ∀k ∈ K, (48)
where ρ is the spectral radius of Wmax, and Wmax is a M ×M matrix whose elements are
Wmaxij =

 0 if i = jmaxk∈K hkjihkii if i 6= j.
(49)
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From (14), the robust game G˜ converges to RNE by using the iterative asynchronous algorithm if
max
s˜i∈Rs,∀i,k
ρ(Wmax) < 1. (50)
In this case, we have Wmax = Wmax +Ŵmax, where Ŵmax is the uncertain parts of Wmax, whose elements
are
W
max
ij =

 0 if i = jmax hkji
hkii
if i 6= j.
(51)
Since Ŵmaxij ≤ max εki s¯ki , from (36) we have
max
s˜i∈Rs
ρ(Wmax) ≤ ‖Wmaxij ‖2 + ‖W ij(k)‖F ≤ ‖W
max
ij ‖2 +
√
|M |‖wmax‖2. (52)
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